This Article offers an explanation of the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in information-intensive vertical supply relationships. In particular, we explore the connection between stronger property rights and the enhanced viability of independent (versus vertically integrated) input supply firms when contracts are incomplete. We start by modeling a tradeoff between two types of information transfer in buyer-supplier relationships: "synergies," in which joint efforts reveal new applications of existing technology; and "leakage," or disclosure of existing information. We show that property rights in the hands of an independent input supplier can create the potential for greater inter-firm synergy, outweighing the risk of leakage. Greater synergies arise due to the supplier's greater effort to adapt its generalized technology to the specific needs of the buyer. Property rights play a crucial role: they reduce the risk of buyer firm opportunism, in effect raising the cost of the buyer's "outside option" in the event the supplierbuyer contract is terminated. The "residual" nature of property rights as described for example by Hart (1995) makes them more effective in this regard than contracts alone. We extend our basic results to analysis of buyouts and spinoffs, and assay an extensive body of empirical evidence. Broad support is found for our approach, pointing the way to future exploration of the relationship between property rights specifications and the opening up of new contracting horizons. 2
Introduction: The Story
This Article offers an explanation of the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in information-intensive vertical supply relationships. We analyze how IPRs affect the tradeoff between high-powered incentives and information spillovers, and show that under plausible conditions, they favor the provision of information intensive inputs by an independent supplier.
Suppose a manufacturing unit MU has a specialized production process utilizing Input Q.
Suppose further that Q is a technologically sophisticated component of MU's production process. In addition, Q is the unique specialty of scientists and engineers who comprise research unit RU. One way for MU to get the input is to employ RU -vertical integration. In the alternative, members of RU could found an independent firm to supply Q in an arm's-length contract with MU.
In making its decision, MU faces a well-recognized tradeoff pitting the possibility of opportunism against high-powered arm's-length contracting (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1996) .
The effort invested in customizing Q may be non-contractible so that RU may shirk. On the other hand, once expended, the effort is sunk, leaving RU vulnerable to reneging by MU. This is a familiar tradeoff in the literature of transaction cost economics. But the details of our story, drawn from the information-rich exchanges we describe, add some important theoretical twists, as formalized in section 2. In supplying Input Q, RU will have to interact extensively with the staff of MU. This entails considerable information exchange. In general, the information in this relationship is of two types: (1) leakage of pre-existing information held by each party; and (2) synergistic generation of new information. Leakage is straightforward: there is almost always information exchange in supplier-buyer transactions; this is particularly true where MU's production process and RU's input are technologically complex. 1 While it is difficult to quantify "typical" rates of information exchange in buyer-supplier contracting, legal disputes and practitioner guidance relating to these transactions provide some insight (MacLachlan, 1995) .
Theft of trade secret cases arising from this context are common. In addition, lawyers often advise clients to contemplate the degree of information exchange that may accompany a supply contract, and to take precautions to prevent undesired leakage (Pooley, 1999: 634) . These are of course purely informal measures. But they do indicate that the issue is a real one.
Synergistic generation of new information is also very common in the kinds of input transactions studied here. The empirical basis is presented in section 3, where we discuss the property rights allocations and contractual provisions real-world parties often craft to deal with leakages and synergies. In general, RU-MU interactions can generate useful information about potential new applications of Input Q, perhaps in the production of other products besides the one contemplated by the original contact. Or RU may learn about opportunities to add to the Input Q product line. For example, it might learn of a way to expand Input Q's functionality to replace other inputs in MU's production process.
2 1 R&D Managers are well aware of this problem. See, e.g., Ragatz, Handfield and Scannell (1997: 199 ) (noting fear of information sharing in new product development outsourcing agreements); Stump and Heide (1996) (describing techniques for "controlling supplier opportunism."). For a good overview, see Handfield, Krause, Scannell and Monczka (2000) . 2 Management literature shows an awareness of these opportunities for synergy. Stuart and McCutcheon (2000: 35) ("They [suppliers] are in on the engineering meetings. They can drop in on the research guys. They know more about our requirements than some of our own people do and are instrumental for concurrent engineering of new products."); McCutcheon, Grant and Hartley (1997: 275) (empirical study of 79 cases of outsourcing involving new component or product design: "Increasing the role of the supplier in design enables the buyer to tap more effectively into the ideas of the supplier for product improvements."); Ragatz, Handfield and Scannell (1997: 200) (summarizing industry experience integrating suppliers into new product development, and finding that the greater the sharing of "intellectual assets" among the partners, the greater the degree of success of the product. Sen and Rubinstein (1989: 130) find, in a study of 31 technology outsourcing contracts, a "high level of R&D involvement by the buyer firm," which includes "new uses, new applications, and new products "; and (1989: 125) note that "flowback [i.e., grantback] clauses may be necessary in outsourcing contracts because of the likelihood that the parties may "improve the acquired technology" during an outsourcing agreement.
These two types of information spillovers -leakage and synergies -are at the heart of the tradeoff modeled in this Article. By choosing to integrate (i.e., by owning RU), MU prevents leakage of information about its products and processes. Greater control over disclosure of internal information is a well-recognized feature of the employment relationship, as compared to independent contractor status (Masten, 1996) . In addition, the law by default vests a firm with ownership of employee inventions, thus allocating to the employer the residual that accompanies ownership of property rights (Merges, 1999) . Integration also internalizes the benefits of synergistic information. In the absence of integration, both RU and MU may base future products on the information generated in the supply relationship. Or they may compete in the market for this information per se, as rival licensors. In either case, (some of) the rents made possible from the new information will be competed away. 3 As the literature on technology pioneers and improvers shows, integration prevents rent dissipation (Scotchmer, 1991) .
On the other side of the ledger, an independent RU has certain information-related advantages. One is obvious: the canonical "high-powered incentives" that flow from arm'slength contracting. This leads in turn to a second, more particular to our context: RU's increased efforts create more synergistic information. The combination of independence and property rights over synergistic information induces RU to work hard to expand the frontiers of Input Q.
New applications and extensions of the technology become more likely. Because an independent RU can directly appropriate the value of the new applications, RU team members will work harder to uncover them. 4 Further, though we do not model it, an independent RU can aggregate 3 The management literature shows a sophisticated awareness of these issues. See, e.g., Leavy (1994 Leavy ( , 1996 . For example, Leavy (1996: 50) states: "Even in the closest of outsourcing relationships, the partners will always remain potential future competitors.") 4 Practitioners recognize this. Michael A. Corbett Associates (2000): When organizations are not changing they favor internal sourcing. Similarly, when they view the internal operation as highly innovative they also favor internal sourcing. However, when there is a information across supply relationships, thus gaining a "multiplier effect" for each unit of synergistic information.
The emphasis on information in this Article represents a departure from prior treatments of vertical integration. Transaction cost economics (TCE) first called attention to the highpowered incentives of arm's-length contracting. TCE incentives take the form of a more direct relationship between effort and profit, with no mention of informational synergies. On the other hand, the discussion of integration in this Article is closer to TCE. Preventing information leakage is closely related to the core TCE concern of integrating to reduce opportunism. It might also be argued that competing for rents from synergistic information is a form of opportunism.
To the extent it is not, this Article extends current thinking by introducing rent dissipation as an explicit factor influencing vertical integration.
The ideas in this Article are close to the spirit of the property rights-firm boundaries literature (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) ("GHM"), but not identical. While the model here is concerned with the allocation of property rights in facilitating more efficient sequential investment, fewer restrictive assumptions are employed. For example, we avoid GHM's exclusive emphasis on the strictly marginal effects of property rights allocations (Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998: 79) . In addition, we explicitly consider "postcontractual" benefits arising from supply relationships -i.e., learning that has value in periods beyond those in simple two-stage models of investment and asset transfer. Most importantly, in this Article property rights specifications are not assumed to be fixed; patent strength is an explicit variable in the model. This permits more robust exploration of the relationship between features of the property rights regime and the "make versus buy" decision.
recognized need for change and when the internal group cannot or is not viewed as being capable of bringing forward the needed changes, then external sourcing becomes the preferred option.
The approach here thus has some similarity to Zingales and Rajan (1998) , whose concept of "access" to assets introduces a more nuanced interpretation of property rights. This Article pays particular attention to R&D-intensive inputs that do not often meet the conditions of their model, however. Finally, the bargaining between pioneers and improvers (Scotchmer, 1991) has some similarity to that between input suppliers and manufacturers (e.g., RU and MU). In both cases, multiple contributors together generate new, complementary information. And in this Article, as in Scotchmer (1991: 35) , integration has the advantage of preventing rent dissipation.
In the pioneer-improver scenario, however, ex ante bargaining is often impossible. Many improvement patents are owned by firms that had no opportunity to negotiate with the pioneer, often because lags in the patent system make it difficult to determine which of two parties will end up the pioneer, and which (if any) the improver (Merges, 1994) . By contrast, suppliers of information-intensive inputs must negotiate with manufacturers ex ante. Indeed, in our model, synergistic information cannot be generated in the absence of RU-MU interaction. Thus our model analyzes the effects of rent dissipation identified in the pioneer-improver literature in a setting where ex ante bargaining is a necessary part of the situation.
The Model
Let V(X) be the benefit to the MU from the purchase of the specialized input, where X represents the stage 1 effort by RU to customize the input, at a cost C(X, Z), where Z is the level of openness chosen by MU. We assume that X ε [X min , X max ], where X min is a baseline level of effort which can be verified. Similarly, we assume Z ε [Z min , Z max ]. We further assume efficient bargaining. Thus, whether MU chooses to integrate RU or not depends on which form yields the greatest joint surplus. We assume that V(X) and C(X, Z) increasing and concave in X, and C(X, Z) and C x (X, Z) are both decreasing in Z, where C x (X, Z) represents the marginal cost of customization. In other words, openness by MU reduces the marginal cost of customization by increasing the flow of information to RU. For simplicity, we assume that openness has no direct costs for MU, though a more realistic situation would be to assume that controlling information flow is costly for MU.
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The process of customizing an input will require information flows between RU and MU.
As noted earlier, such flows can have two types of consequences. Information exchange can also lead to the synergistic creation of new information.
Because only an independent RU has an incentive to work hard to reveal new information, disintegrating RU from MU can unlock significant potential value. New applications and extensions 5 Trade secret law protects information only upon a showing of "reasonable precautions" against disclosure, such as costly monitoring and sequestering. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7 th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.). For a descriptive account of such "fencing costs," see Merges et al. (2000: 49) . 6 Handfield, (2000: 40) :
One of the biggest challenges in supplier development is cultivating mutual trust. Suppliers may be reluctant to share information on costs and processes; the need to release sensitive and confidential information may compound this hesitation. Ambiguous or intimidating legal issues and ineffective lines of communication also may inhibit the trust building necessary for a successful supplier-development effort.
of the technology may be revealed. 7 We model this as follows. After the customization is completed, with probability P(X, Z), MU and RU receive payoffs of Π M and Π R , and with probability The timing and structure of the game is as follows: RU begins the game with a property right (i.e., patent) over the general design of its input. If RU and MU are part of the same firm, the property rights belong to the firm as a whole. After the initial contract details are settled, RU and MU choose levels of X and Z respectively. We assume that neither X nor Z are contractible, but both MU and RU can observe the levels of X and Z. MU may also make a transfer payment to RU. The role of this first stage payment, T 1 , is essentially to divide the total surplus between the two. This concludes stage 1 of the game. In stage 2, RU and MU negotiate second stage payments, T 2 . At this point, both X and Z are "sunk," thus opening the door to potential holdup problems. In stage 3, which is unique to our model, the information flows result in spillovers 7 To the extent that only RU becomes aware of the new application, this is formally equivalent to a reduction in cost, C(X, Z), and likewise, if only MU becomes aware of the new application, this is equivalent to an increase in V(X).
8 Note that Π M > W defines synergy whereas Π = W defines leakages. It is clear that these cases are mutually exclusive. However, they are not exhaustive i.e., we are ruling out by assumption the case where Π > W and Π M < W, where information exchange always leads to a loss for MU but a net social gain. with probability P(X, Z). This may be thought of as the post-contractual period: the "out years" when learning gained during the supply relationship is applied to the economic activities of RU and MU. We assume that an independent RU and MU may not contract not to compete with each other in stage 3, implying rent dissipation in stage 3.
To highlight the role played by patents, we first analyze the special case when stage 3 is absent. We demonstrate that patents can make possible contracts where an independent RU invests in customization.
Special Case: No spillovers

Specialization (RU is independent)
Once the investment is sunk, the parties bargain over the payment MU must make to RU.
We assume the bargaining results in an equal split of the surplus defined by the "threat points" of the two parties. MU can threaten to end the relationship. Should it do so, RU will withdraw its input. After termination, MU would be able to duplicate RU's design of the input, or transfer the RU design to a third party supplier, getting a net benefit of L(X). Here we assume that the ability of MU to produce the input for itself may benefit from the effort RU makes in customizing the input, and the disclosure of information by RU in the process of customizing the input. 9 The joint profit maximizing level of effort is given by X OPT = argmax {V(X) -C(X, Z)}, so that even with L(X) = 0, the RU's investment in customization in stage 1 is sub-optimal.
If T 2 is the second stage payment, then we have
9 MU learns from RU in several ways: directly, through sharing of blueprints and the like; indirectly, e.g., by closely inspecting the physical embodiment of the input; or through some combination of the two. In this sense it is not particularly important what form the input takes. If RU is a software supplier, for example, it could supply MU either with finished computer code to be directly incorporated into MU's own end-user software product, or so that
Knowing this, in stage 1, RU chooses X to maximize T 2 -C(X, Z). MU chooses Z to maximize V(X) -T 2 . Since we assume Z has no direct cost, the choice of Z is indeterminate. We assume that MU will choose Z = Z max . 10 The joint surplus is V(X S ) -C(X S , Z max ) where X S is the effort level chosen by RU. It is easy to see that T 1 is given by
This is the point where RU's patents play a role. RU's patent on the general design of its input implies that if MU had to "invent around" RU's patents, L(X) would be lower than V(X).
In this sense, the level of L(X) is inversely related to the effectiveness of intellectual property protection. This formulation is similar to the one used in Gallini (1985) and Arora (1995; .
For analytical convenience, we assume that L(X) = kV(X), where
decrease in k corresponds to an increase in the "strength" of patent protection. Thus, one can write the choice of X as
We assume throughout that argmax {½(1-k min ) V(X) -C(X, Z max )} > X min , so that strong enough patent protection will induce customization effort beyond the baseline level.
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with "high level" design information on how to achieve a particular software objective. We assume only that the input supplied by RU has a high degree of information content. 10 This would be true if, for instance, MU could move earlier or could commit. This would also be true if we added a small component to V(X) that was increasing in Z.
11 Note further that if T 2, the second stage payment, can be contracted for in advance and MU can commit not to renegotiate, it will be set so that MU is indifferent between ending the contract and making the payment, i.e., T 2, = L(X) = kV(X). In this case, for k small enough, X = X OPT . This is formally shown in Arora (1996) and is similar to the result in Noldeke and Schmidt (1998) . The outline of the proof is simple enough. Set T 2 = (1-k)V(X OPT ). Now for any choice of X < X OPT , MU will end the contract, giving RU a payoff of -C(X, Z). For X ≥ X OPT , MU will make the payment, providing RU with a payoff of (1-k)V(X OPT )-C(X,Z). Since C(X,Z) is increasing X, the RU either chooses X = X OPT or X min . For k small enough,
Proof Obvious and omitted.
Vertical Integration
Under vertical integration, the MU (more precisely, the combined entity) owns the inputs and any associated intellectual property rights and RU cannot withdraw its inputs in the event of a disagreement. Accordingly, it has no incentive to invest effort beyond the baseline level X min .
As before, technically the value of Z is indeterminate but we assume that it is set to Z max .
Let ∆(k) represent the difference in joint surplus between specialization and vertical
so is ∆(k). Proposition 1 below summarizes this discussion. 
Proposition 1 When information spillovers do not exist, (i)
Information Spillovers
With information spillovers, vertical integration prevents rent dissipation. Further, the existence of spillovers will not change the stage 2 bargaining since, by assumption, the spillovers are not affect by whether the two parties adhere to the contract, but only by whether the two parties can independently exploit the information spillovers. If the probability of such spillovers were exogenously set at P , the nature of the spillovers (leakage or synergy) would be irrelevant, and the levels of X and Z would be identical to those without spillovers. The difference in the joint surplus ∆ is given by
The two terms represent the trade-off between specialization and integration in our model. The first term represents the benefits from the superior incentives possible under specialization. It is non-negative since X S ≥ X min . The second term represents the loss (compared to integration) from rent dissipation. Therefore ∆ is no longer unambiguously positive as it now involves a tradeoff between greater surplus from customization and rent dissipation. Whereas the surplus from customization is increasing in the strength of RU's patents, rent dissipation is not.
Thus, as long as the rent dissipated is strictly less than the maximum potential surplus from customization, specialization yields greater joint surplus for intellectual property rights stronger than some threshold value. Formally, we have
Note that X(0) = X opt , and X(k max ) = X min . Thus, ∆(0) > 0 and ∆( k max ) < 0. By continuity, there
In general, the probability of spillover would depend on the level of effort by RU and the level of openness allowed by MU. This provides an additional source of incentive for customization by an independent RU, because greater customization effort increases the probability of RU earning additional rents through information spillovers. Thus RU's property right can lead, indirectly, to greater customization: by preventing MU opportunism at stage 2, the property right encourages more investment in customization at stage 1, and therefore leads to higher spillovers in the post-contractual period, stage 3.
Specialization
Under specialization, however, the nature of the spillovers matter as well: MU will not choose to be fully open, if by doing so it increases the probability of a leakage resulting in a loss.
Formally, the choice of X and Z are given by (6).
Recall that if the spillover consists of a leakage of existing information, Π M −W < 0.
Since P(X, Z) is increasing in Z, MU will choose the lowest possible level of openness, Z min .
Therefore, if X L s represents the choice of X under specialization and leakages,
However, if spillovers create synergies, Π M −W > 0, so that MU will choose the highest level of openness, Z max . If X s s represents the choice of X under specialization and synergy,
Under both types of spillovers, RU will receive a positive payoff, the probability of which is increasing in RU's customization efforts. Consequently, spillovers enhance RU's incentives to invest effort. Further, RU's effort increases as Π R increases. Thus, even with weak patents, RU may provide customization effort. The level of this incentive does depend on the type of spillover. Even if RU were to receive the same level of payoff in both cases, the greater openness by MU under synergies will result in greater effort by RU. (Recall that greater openness by MU reduces the marginal cost of customization to RU.) 13 
Integration
Under integration, the choice of X and Z are given by (9).
Thus, RU will provide the baseline level of effort, X min , and MU will choose the maximium level of openness, Z max . Under synergies, this is the unique outcome, since Π > W.
Under leakage, the chosen level of openness is indeterminate because Π = W under leakage.
However, as before, we assume that when indifferent, MU chooses the maximum level of openness. Thus, under leakages, specialization implies an additional source of inefficiency because MU will not allow free flow of information, resulting in higher customization cost and lower customization effort, albeit also a lower probability of rent dissipation. Proposition 2 summarizes these results
Proposition 2 With information spillovers, (i) RU's effort is higher than in the absence of spillovers and increases with the spillover rents to RU, ceteris paribus. RU's efforts also increase in the strength of RU's patents. (ii) MU chooses the maximum (minimum) level of openness under synergy (leakage). (iii) Ceteris Paribus, RU's effort is higher under synergy than under leakage.
The difference in the joint surplus between specialization and integration under leakages, is represented by ∆(k) L and ∆(k) s represents the difference under synergy.
The first two terms of (10b) are decreasing in k since X s s is decreasing in k. Moreover, the last term is independent of k, so that ∆(k) s is decreasing in k. Thus, by an argument similar to proposition 2, for patent strength stronger than some threshold value, specialization yields a higher surplus. However, ∆(k) L cannot be unambiguously signed because the third term in (10a) is increasing in k. Although X L s is decreasing in k, (Π M + Π R −Π) is negative. Stronger patent rights for RU, by increasing the incentives for customization effort, also increase the probability of rent dissipation. Therefore, specialization may yield a lower surplus when RU's intellectual property rights are strong.
Holding the extent of rent dissipation constant, as one increases the size of the total rents from information spillovers, ∆(k) s increases. To see this rewrite (10b) as follows
where R = (Π − Π M − Π R ) is the extent of rent dissipation.
Holding rent dissipation, R, constant, an increase in the size of the rents from spillovers, Π, will increase ∆(k) s because the coefficient of Π in (11) positive.
14 On the other hand, an increase in the size of the spillover rent but holding the rent dissipation constant will leave ∆(k) L unchanged. Proposition 3 summarizes these results. 
Changing Tradeoffs: The Role of Buyout Options and Spinoffs
A recent paper by Noldeke and Schmidt (1998) shows that options to buy can overcome many of the problems in a GHM model with two sided non-contractible investments, provided the investments are observable and made sequentially. In essence, the option to buy recreates a residual claimant -the party moving second and holding the option. Our model is more specialized. We have assumed an input supply relationship where effectively MU is the residual claimant of the value created through the input supply.
Providing MU with an option to buyout RU does, however, increase efficiency under specialization. It eliminates rent dissipation, which is the drawback with an independent RU.
Indirectly, this also increases incentives for an independent RU because it is in MU's interests to offer a buyout price that is at least as high as Π R . This suggests that allowing MU the option to buyout RU when spillovers occur implies that specialization yields a greater joint surplus than integration. Under these conditions, an option to purchase (a controlling interest in) RU may make sense ex ante. This solution combines the immediate benefits of high-powered incentives from asset ownership and contracting with the contingent payoff scheme of Noldeke and Schmidt (1998) . We formalize this intuition in the appendix and show that this is true even if, under integration, RU threatens to break away from MU. Further, unlike Noldeke and Schmidt (1998) , the result does not depend on the buyout price being negotiated in advance.
Discussion
One can re-interpret our model as providing a simple theory of spinoffs as well. Consider the case where MU owns RU but before stage 1, can decide whether to spin it off as an independent firm. If it does so and endows RU with the patents relating to the input technology, and only then enters into a contract for customization and input supply, this effectively corresponds to specialization in our model. Proposition 3 would then predict that such a spin-off would take place if the input technology had strong enough patent protection, so that the benefits from greater customization effort by RU outweighed the rent dissipation from the spin-off, particularly if the spillovers were synergistic. Section 3 includes discussion of SepraChem, a Sepracor spinoff, that supports this story.
The tradeoff between an independent RU and an integrated MU-RU firm is primarily a function of three factors: the amount of incontractible investment required to tailor RU's input to MU; the risk of leakage from MU to RU; and the potential for synergistic gains from the RU-MU relationship (which incorporates RU's potential future profits from exploiting its share of the synergistic gains). Firms might anticipate that ex ante, the better decision is to permit RU to remain independent. However, the parties might also anticipate proprietary information might leak out or that the technology could develop so as to expose MU to greater risk of competition from RU, or so as to lower the implicit costs of integration (e.g., by making the technology more predictable, thus permitting more credible performance-pay contracts for researchers). Under these conditions, an option to purchase (a controlling interest in) RU may make sense ex ante.
On the other hand, a research project that grows naturally out of MU's integrated research division may present opportunities for efficiency gains if it is "spun out" into an independent firm (Klepper and Sleeper, 2000) . Intuitively, the increased possibilities for synergy between RU and various buyers of Input Q present attractive gains from trade that can only be realized by a well-motivated (i.e., independent) RU. In addition, though we do not model it here, for a third party buyer of Input Q, the risk of leakage increases if RU is a division of MU: it is difficult to prevent the parent, MU, from learning about the third party's manufacturing operations. Significantly, the management literature reflects both these advantages of spinoffs. 15 .
Although in this Article the connection between buyouts, spinoffs, and property rights is somewhat speculative, note that ownership of a research partner's IPR portfolio is often a crucial factor motivating buyouts, and spinoff firms appear always to be set up with a viable portfolio of IPRs of their own. Again, the SepraChem spinoff story in section 3 is an example.This suggests that property rights considerations permeate integration decisions, even contingent ones.
Empirical Support
This section examines empirical evidence for the theory. Three types of evidence are adduced: (1) empirical studies tracing industry-level connections between IPR strength and the volume of licensing; (2) a summary of specialized input suppliers and their patents in the fine 15 Alster (1995: 49) (describing advantages of spinoffs from established firms, and "spinouts" from "incubator" firms); Lepree, 1995 (SepraChem, spinoff Braun and MacDonald (1978, pp. 121-145), and Malone (1985) ; for disk drives, see Chesbrough (1999) . chemical and pharmaceutical industries; and (3) a case study of one transaction, between a technology-intensive input supplier and a large bio-pharmaceutical firm.
The role of patents in facilitating arm's-length transactions in technology is supported by the findings of Anand and Khanna (1997) . In a study of 1612 licensing agreements, Anand and Khanna (1997) find that weak IPRs are associated with a lower incidence of licensing activity, especially with respect to "prospective" (to-be-developed) technologies. A key finding of the study is that in industries where IPRs are important, licensing, as a percentage of all alliances, is much more frequent than in other industries. 16 In the IP-intensive chemical-related industries, approximately 1/3 of the alliances are licenses, whereas licenses constitutes only 18% and 24%, respectively, of the alliances in computers and electronics (Anand and Khanna, 1997: 17) .
Transfers of technology do take place even in industries where IPRs are weak. The nature of the transactions differ, however. Firms in industries characterized by weak rights are more likely to engage in non-licensing alliances such as joint ventures (Oxley, 1998 (Oxley, , 1999 Anand and Khanna, 1997: 16-23) . They are also less likely to contract regarding to-be-developed technology (Anand and Khanna, 1997: 23) . A recent study by Gans, Hsu and Stern (2000) of the commercialization strategies of 100 startup firms finds that when startups have robust IPR protection, and when they have venture capitalists backing them, they are more likely to cooperate (i.e., license or contract) with incumbents. In contrast, when IP protection is weak, and when venture capitalists are not involved, startups are more likely to compete with incumbent firms by introducing competitive products. Hellmann and Puri (2000) found that startup firms 16 Numerous studies document differences in the strength of intellectual property protection across various industries. In particular, patents are known to be most effective in chemical industries. They are widely thought significantly less effective in computers, electronics, and related fields Nelson, 1990, citing Levin et. al. 1986 ).
that received venture capital were more likely to have patents, and had more patents, ceteris paribus, than other firms.
In a related vein, Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2000) trace the connection between the tradition of well-defined patent rights and the highly active licensing market in the chemical industry. Hall and Ham-Ziedonis (2000) , in a general study of patents in the semiconductor industry, find that firms in the emerging semiconductor component industry are much more patent-intensive than other semiconductor firms of the same size but not developing components.
They explain this by noting that these firms commercialize their technology only through licensing to large, often competitive firms that integrate components on a single "system on a chip". Thus where property rights are effectively weaker, the data suggest a resort to alternative appropriability mechanisms. Instead of straight arm's-length transfer, firms prefer (1) joint ventures and other alliance forms, and (2) licenses to entities with whom they have had past relationships. Both of these can be seen as attempts to restrict the harmful effects of information disclosure that technology transfer would entail.
Industry-level Support: Chemical Intermediates
Aggregate studies thus support the broad outlines of the theory in section 2. Industrylevel trends in fine chemicals and pharmaceutical intermediates lend additional support. In the past, chemical and pharmaceutical firms did very little outsourcing at the production stage. Now, however, the industry trade press describes significant growth in vertical supply transactions (The Economist, 1998; Chemical Business NewsBase, 1997; Chemical Market Reporter, 1997 Briefly, many molecules can exist in two mirror-image forms; they are said to be "chiral." The majority of biomolecules occurring in the human body exist in only one of the two possible forms. Because the wrong chiral form can be ineffective or harmful (as in the case of the drug thalidomide), sophisticated catalysts are required to ensure that the manufacturing process for a pharmaceutical product yields only the desired form of the molecule. See generally Ball (1994: 77-78) .
18 Rose-Maniace, 1997 . See also Chemical Market Reporter (1997) ("Technology is the differentiator" for makers of fine chemicals, according to an official of ChiroTech, a U.K.-based contract researcher and manufacturer; this firm for example "offers commercial quantities of S-naproxen, via a proprietary . . . bioresolution process.").
19 See, e.g. U.S. Patent 5,684,157, "Process for the preparation of optionally 2-substituted 5-chloroimidazole-4-carbaldehydes," issued Nov. 4, 1997, and assigned to Lonza, Inc.; U.S. Patent 5,446,102, "Olefin metathesis catalysts for degelling polymerization," issued Aug. 29, 1995, assigned to Catalytica Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; U.S. Patent 5,658,796, "Optical resolution of alkyl chroman-2-carboxylates," issued Aug. 19, 1997, assigned to SepraChem, Inc. ("A process for resolving racemic alkyl 1,4-benzodioxan-2-carboxylates useful as intermediates in the synthesis of optically pure pharmaceutical compounds such as (S)-doxazosin is disclosed.") chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturing. 20 And it is clear that firms believe their proprietary process technologies are a major selling point for the outsourcing industry. Fine chemicals are usually produced to specification in lower volumes using complex manufacturing processes and must satisfy well-defined chemical specifications, which generally results in a closer relationship between the fine chemical producer and the customer. Fine chemicals typically are sold for higher prices than other chemicals. Rapid response to potential customers, reliability of product supply and quality are important competitive factors. . . . A key component of Fine Chemicals' (Catalytica?) strategy is to become involved with its customers early in the design of the drug manufacturing process. Fine Chemicals believes that its technology and expertise enables it to develop efficient manufacturing processes at the research and clinical samples stage and successfully scale-up such processes for the manufacture of commercial volumes. These broad capabilities, coupled with its research, pilot and manufacturing facilities, should enable it to develop close relationships with its customers by becoming an integral part of their drug development process and a key preferred supplier of the customer's commercial fine chemical requirements.
See also www.catalytica-inc.com (12/1/00):
We work closely with our customers, under confidentiality, beginning early in the development of their new catalysts to ensure that reliable, high-quality, cost-effective supplies are available when needed to begin commercial production of the corresponding polymers. The Agreement does not define what it would mean for an improvement to be "specific" to Glaxo's products, but it is very likely that Chirex learns much in the course of each supply relationship that it can use in its others. It is Chirex's ownership of its own production technology -the patents to its chiral intermediates and ways to produce them -that encourages Chirex to invest in the Glaxo -specific know-how required to adapt Chirex technology to Glaxo's products. 27 See, e.g., www.catalytica-inc.com (12/1/00):
Since the acquisition of the Greenville Facility from Glaxo Wellcome in 1997, Catalytica has entered into over 40 new agreements for the development and manufacture of products for various pharmaceutical and
Ownership of patents covering the design of its input products provides a supply firm with a reasonable fallback position in the event that future trades with the customer firm do not come through, a possibility that the financial disclosure documents of chiral suppliers explicitly note. 28 Rose-Maniace (1996) , for instance, describes custom manufacturing firm Albermarle, Inc., which "has patents on S + -ibuprofen production, which it makes in small quantities for a
[single] customer in Europe." There is thus good reason to believe that in chemical production outsourcing, the production firm's assets (patents) are what facilitate the customer-specific investments required to manufacture the customer's product. And it is clear that in the long term, these investments will be firm-specific, and protected, if at all, as trade secrets (Rose-Mariace, 1996 Rose-Mariace (1996) (quoting industry consultant): "In the short term, a great deal of process work and patenting is still being done. In the longer term, optimization of the processes will be protected as trade secrets."
30 Cf. Manufacturing Chemist (1997: 11) ("The trend to outsourcing means that small niche companies are springing up to provide contract synthesis and clinical trials . . . .").
capacities for microorganisms as well as for cells of mammalian sources, extraction from animal and plant tissues, genetic engineering, protein refolding, and protein and enzyme technology.
Importantly, for the story being told here, these newly-formed spinoffs are endowed with a portfolio of patents from the parent firm (Lepree, 1995 Outsourcing in the chemical production industry thus exemplifies the thesis advanced here. Patents facilitate arm's-length trade of a technology-intensive input, leading to entry and specialization. This is part of a larger story in the chemical industry, in which firms adapt to the patent environment and patent protection in turn helps shape industry structure (Arora and Gambardella, 1998) .
Case Study: Alkermes-Genentech Supply Agreement
To give some real-world context, we will consider in some depth a representative collaboration in an IPR-intensive industry: a joint development agreement between Genentech, the largest biotechnology company in the world, and a very small firm specializing in sophisticated drug delivery technology, Alkermes, Inc.
Alkermes is one of a number of firms working on advanced drug delivery techniques.
Some are well known, such as the transdermal patches now common for delivery of nicotine and nitroglycerin. Others are more exotic. Alkermes, for instance, has developed a procedure for coating an active ingredient in very thin polymeric capsules. The capsules are made of material 31 Lepree (1995) . Lepree (1995) also states: "SepraChem presently produces intermediates and actives for Sepracor and other drug companies, using its [proprietary] ChiRedox platform of chiral synthesis and separation." that breaks down over time in the human body. Unlike traditional encapsulation (e.g., the "thousands of tiny time capsules" of "Contac" cold medicine fame), Alkermes' technology yields much smaller microcapsules and can be used on ingredients that have traditionally fared poorly in encapsulated form.
It is important to recognize at the outset that there is no hard and fast reason why Genentech could not pursue advanced delivery systems itself. It is certainly no barrier that novel delivery vehicles require sophisticated manufacturing. Genentech has mastered very complex manufacturing problems relating to a number of its biotechnology products. Likewise, the high R&D intensity of the drug delivery business is no barrier; Genentech pursues R&D of unmatched depth and breadth in the biotechnology industry. And there is no legal or regulatory barrier keeping Genentech from this line of business. Clearly, there is something about the capabilities of Alkermes that makes it attractive for Genentech to buy from Alkermes.
Genentech is not alone. The Alkermes business model is to develop microencapsulated versions of highly successful drugs. 32 This it does in close collaboration with the large drug firms that own the rights to the drugs: it has deals with Schering-Plough, Johnson and Johnson, and of course Genentech, among others. Drug firms enter into these deals to access Alkermes'
proprietary delivery technology, which makes the drugs easier to take, and in some cases opens up new submarkets not available using conventional delivery techniques. 33 See, e.g., Mary Welch, "Extended Formulation Strong in Phase III Study, Genentech, Alkermes Report," BioWorld, Oct. 23, 1998, "Both companies probably will start Nutropin Depot trials on adults at some point," [Richard] Pops [, CEO of Alkermes] said. "With adults, it's not a matter of trying to increase height, but there are some other manifestations of growth hormone deficiency ," he said. "A lot of adults don't take growth hormones because they don't want to deal with daily shots."
The basic structure of the Genentech-Alkermes deal follows the logic of the TCE literature. 34 There are two stages to the transaction: (1) Alkermes adapts its microencapsulation drug delivery technology to Genentech's successful therapeutic product, a genetically engineered form of the naturally-occurring protein called Human Growth Hormone (HGH); and (2) Alkermes manufactures the product for Genentech and sells it at a pre-agreed price, with
Genentech then marketing and distributing it. 35 Interestingly, Alkermes is required to make substantial investments in adapting its technology to Genentech's product and in creating the production process needed to manufacture it. This is evident from the License Agreement, which contemplates the creation of "Alkermes Knowhow," defined in § 2.1 as "data . . ., knowledge, discoveries, . . . specifications, . . . methods, processes, and techniques" during the course of the Agreement. 36 As would be expected, Alkermes grants a license to Genentech for the use of this knowhow during the course of the agreement, but such information is rarely set down in "codified" form and hence is difficult to monitor or transfer. This aspect of the License Agreement does not survive termination, which means that Alkermes is free to use and adapt the knowhow it develops whether or not it sells product to Genentech. The agreement thus contemplates the creation of information that might well be useful to Alkermes in subsequent supply relationships, and makes no attempt to prevent Alkermes from using that information in the future -good evidence for the synergies discussed in our model in section 2.
34 License Agreement Between Alkermes Controlled Therapeutics, Inc. and Genentech, Inc., effective November 13, 1996, attached as Exhibit 10.3 to SEC Form 8-K, filed by Alkermes, Inc., on November 14, 1996, available on SEC EDGAR database at www.sec.gov/edaux/formlynx.htm (hereafter "Genentech-Alkermes Agreement").
35 Alkermes-Genentech Agreement, § 6 ("Genentech agrees to pursue a diligent sales and marketing effort for a Licensed Product to be sold by Genentech relative to other products of similar commercial potential that are being sold and marketed by Genentech. There is a pre-agreed price for the sale of microencapsulated HGH in the Agreement (License Agreement § 5.1), and Genentech's broad termination right gives it in effect the power not to exercise the option ( § 9).
Clearly, given its commitment to purchase from Alkermes at a pre-determined price, Genentech faces the risk that Alkermes will provide a low quality or an inadequately adapted product. The agreement protects Genentech by giving it a very broad right of unilateral termination: basically, at any time for any reason, prior to Alkermes' commencement of commercial manufacture; and upon six months notice after commercial production. And Genentech has broad power to decide whether Alkermes is living up to its obligation to produce commercial grade product that meets Genentech's standards.
Genentech's broad powers imply a great deal of risk for Alkermes. It could easily invest millions of dollars in the R&D and scale-up needed to meet Genentech's predicted demand, and then see the entire deal terminated with little recourse. The License is quite explicit in this respect ( § 4.3(A)):
Alkermes shall be responsible for, and shall use its commercially reasonable efforts to, scale up the process for producing Licensed Product for both clinical and (unless Genentech manufactures commercial Licensed Product pursuant to Section 5) commercial requirements provided that Genentech supplies sufficient quantities of human growth hormone (at Genentech's expense) to enable Alkermes to do so. Exhibit C attached hereto sets forth the anticipated timeline, requirements and costs for scaling-up the manufacturing process for making Licensed Product for clinical and commercial use to treat pediatric [Growth Hormone Deficiency]. Genentech shall not be responsible for any of Alkermes' capital cost of its facilities except as otherwise set forth in Exhibit C or approved by the [joint development committee set up by the companies under the agreement]. 37 36 The Agreement provides for an up-front prepaid royalty and a small loan from Genentech, but does not characterize this as payment for development of the knowhow. It would be very hard to verify that particular funds were used to developed knowhow, or to evaluate the quality of the knowhow, in any event.
37 The Agreement on file with the SEC had these provisions redacted. It is very unlikely that these exceptions to the "no capital contribution" clause were significant, however, for two reasons. First, a large dollar value item would be unlikely to be relegated to an Appendix of the Agreement; it would likely have been heavily negotiated and hence incorporated into the body of the contract. Second, a large contribution by Genentech would have had to be recognized somewhere on Alkermes' books, and reported as "material" under the Securities laws. So what protection does Alkermes have? One important one is ownership of the assets that enable production of the microencapsulated drug that Genentech wants. While these assets do take on a tangible form, it is clear that Genentech could duplicate the production process if it wanted. (Indeed, it has the right to take over production if it deems Alkermes' efforts unsatisfactory, and it has world-class production facilities at its disposal with which to do so.)
What is left, in a word, is patents. As the theory developed here predicts, Alkermes is quite "patent intensive".
38 Alkermes currently has 43 patents covering (1) its microencapsulation process; 39 (2) novel polymers and preparations that make up the coatings; 40 and (3) microencapsulated formulations of the drugs it delivers under its collaboration agreements. Our current focus is on the development of broadly applicable drug delivery technologies addressing several important drug delivery opportunities, including injectable sustained release of proteins, peptides and small molecule pharmaceutical compounds, the pulmonary delivery of both small molecules and proteins and peptides, drug delivery to the brain across the blood-brain barrier and oral drug delivery systems. We are applying delivery technologies to develop programs for our collaborators and for our own account. . . . Our experience with the application of ProLease [delivery technology] to a wide range of proteins and peptides has shown that high incorporation efficiencies and high drug loads can be achieved. 42 License Agreement, § § 1.3 (Definition of "Alkermes Patents," which includes after-acquired patents relating to protein microencapsulation); 2.1(A) (Grant of License Right to Genentech); and 9 (Termination: grant of license does not survive termination).
implementation of its input technology thus play an important role in limiting Genentech's ability to act opportunistically.
The model in section 2 is predicated on the idea that each supply contract provides opportunities for Alkermes to recognize and develop new applications of its technology because it is an independent firm. Alkermes has now adapted its microencapsulation technology to a number of highly profitable pharmaceutical products sold by other firms. In fact, it has now obtained four patents on the microencapsulated form of Genentech's HGH. 43 Alkermes has several patents on microencapsulated versions of other best-selling therapeutic products in the biotechnology industry, including Schering-Plough's Alpha Interferon.
44
The three HGH-specific patents were applied for after the commencement of the microencapsulation technology is consistent with the role patents play in the model of section 2 of this Article. In addition, evidence from Alkermes' various supply relationships shows that numerous patentable inventions have resulted from the adaptation of the generic technology to particular customer needs. This shows that Alkermes has expended considerable effort in implementing these supply agreements. The overall impression is that the Alkermes-Genentech supply agreement shows a good fit between the structure of biotechnology agreements and many features of our model.
Post-Contractual Period: Evidence of Synergies and Rent Dissipation
Neither specialty chemical supply deals, nor the Alkermes-Genentech agreement, provide any evidence so far of post-contractual rent dissipation. So we must turn to evidence drawn from other supply relationships. A quick review of several recent cases drawn from Merges (2000a) will suffice to show that rent dissipation is a plausible follow-on to an information-intensive supply relationship. We make no claims of completeness or representativeness in this presentation, however.
Recall from section 2 that dissipation may result when MU and RU compete in the exploitation of the new knowledge revealed in the course of the RU-MU supply relationship. 52 In this case, the supplier's information was transferred to the manufacturing firm by an ex-employee, who was subsequently enjoined from further disclosure of the supplier's trade secrets. The case therefore illustrates the effects of dissipation when synergistic rents are created in the absence of a valid supply agreement. The point remains, however, that the two parties to the case ended up competing over markets for products and information that resulted from synergistic intermixture of their respective information -the manufacturer's proprietary brake design, and the supplier's manufacturing-related trade secrets.
We have modeled the effects of property rights on the "make or buy" decision concerning information-intensive inputs. We feature a tradeoff: between integration, which avoids rent dissipation; and a freestanding input supply firm with property rights, which can encourage generation of synergistic information, in addition to the conventional benefits of specialization.
This explains the increasingly common phenomenon of independent suppliers of informationintensive inputs. We also show that, perhaps counterintuitively, the advantages of specialization increase when anticipated synergies are large. In other words, when the future spillovers relate to a larger market, specialization is more efficient. The intuition is that an increase in the spillover rents increases the joint payoff to increasing the probability of spillovers. The probability increases with RU's efforts, which are higher under specialization than under integration.
We do not mean to argue that spillovers and synergies are always the dominant motivations for specialization. In particular, two additional issues, not directly accounted for in our model, deserve mention: (1) economies of scale and reduced duplication from specialization; and (2) high spillover/low appropriability environments, which may provide an independent rationale for specialized firms.
Conventionally, an independent RU has multiple customers for its input. This allows the usual "extent of the market" benefits; for example, there may be economies of scale in producing the input. In addition, RU learns something from each customer. This information is aggregated in the hands of RU, in a way it would not be if each producer used an integrated supplier. RU is thus in a position to disseminate (at least some) "best practice" information, in a manner quite familiar from the literature on specialized engineering firms in the chemical industry (Arora and Gambardella, 1998; Freeman, 1968) . Finally, an independent RU may be more efficient in disseminating new applications because a single source lowers transaction costs. Other potential users of Input Q need not approach MU, and all other producers, for the latest information relating to Input Q. Relatedly, RU is likely to be a central source for property rights relating to Input Q and its applications -either as owner, or in a "clearinghouse" role. 53 There may be transactional economies of scale, in other words.
Another potential advantage of specialization relates to a specialized firm's role in disseminating information. Such firms may facilitate inter-firm information flows, which in some cases may be efficient for all involved. The loss from leakage of MU information may be offset by the gain from RU's sharing of other firm's information. This is similar to "informal know-how sharing" among process engineers in the steel industry (von Hippel 1987; Schrader, 1991; Harhoff, Henkel and von Hippel, 2000) . It is also related to motives for firm participation in "open source" software development (Lerner and Tirole, 1999; von Hippel, 2000) , and to the sharing of information among research scientists (Merges, 1996a) . 54 To be sure, firms do not always need specialized intermediaries to facilitate spillovers. But specialized firms may mediate information flows in ways that make it acceptable to industry members, for example by selectively sharing information or by disseminating it after some time lag. Trust and reputation may play a role as well. Though speculative, these potential benefits of specialization must be acknowledged. A tolerance on the part of MU for high spillovers is not inconsistent with the story of our model, but it would reduce the deleterious effects from leakage, and might suggest a countervailing consideration in the firms' preferences regarding property right strength, or at least enforcement.
While the theory presented here is not a comprehensive theory of specialization, it does extend our understanding of the incentive effects of IPRs. Stronger patents in our model lead to more firm specialization. Independent research-intensive suppliers are more viable at the margin when stronger patents are available. Patents thus make it possible to realize the effects of highpowered incentives. The combination of a property right and an arm's-length supply contract add up to greater efficiency. This has obvious implications for firm strategy. It also should affect our views of the economic consequences of strengthening IPRs. The conventional story of stronger property rights and greater incentives to innovate remains intact. But the mechanism we introduce goes beyond the conventional correlation between property right strength and expected
profit. In our model, stronger property rights translate into greater incentives indirectly. Statebacked property rights unleash the high-powered incentives of arm's-length contracting.
The model thus accounts well for the simultaneous emergence of stronger IPRs and various transaction-intensive organizational forms in industries where products are informationintensive. Straightforward extensions of our model also shed light on two issues of recent interest: (1) use of options to buy R&D units as a way to resolve sequential investment problems under incomplete contractibility; and (2) spinoffs from parent firms.
Our model demonstrates a plausible connection between property rights, firm boundaries, and even industry structure. And by drawing on two heretofore disparate strands of analysis -the economics of property rights and transaction cost economics -we also demonstrate some interesting interaction effects between two foundational legal categories, property and contract.
For example, one implication (though not a direct result) of our model is that property rights can serve as "hard" constraints on the behavior of a contracting party -that is, constraints that are robust to (at least some) efforts to renegotiate contracts, and even to post-contract termination
